La práctica jurídica consuetudinaria y alternativa del pueblo indígena del distrito de Amantaní (lago Titica-Perú) contrastada con el derecho nacional peruano.
Fecha
2008
Autores
González Palacios, Carlos Alberto
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Editor
Universidad Nacional, Costa Rica
Resumen
Existen diferentes grupos culturales en Perú, muchos de los cuales poseen su propio sistema de resolución de conflictos a través de la costumbre local. Sin embargo, cunado esta costumbre local o derecho consuetudinario se confronta con el derecho nacional de inspiración europea, nace una suerte de fusión jurídico-cultural en la cual el derecho consuetudinario pierde parte de su arraigo cultural a causa de ciertas condiciones prescritas desde un grupo cultural mayoritario.
Esta problemática se refleja por ejemplo en el distrito peruano de Amantaní, compuesto por islas en el la de Titicaca, ya que sus habitantes poseen su propio derecho consuetudinario frente al cual el derecho nacional trata de afirmarse. Así, aunque la constitución peruana reconoce el derecho consuetudinario de los pueblos originarios, esta los conmina, por ejemplo, al respeto de los derechos fundamentales de la persona que son el fruto de una importación desde Occidente.
Pero acaso ¿aquello que un pueblo considera como fundamental debe ser fundamental para todos? Y aún más importante: ¿un grupo cultural mayoritario o con poder posee legitimidad para imponer un modelo jurídico a otros grupos culturales? De hecho, tal vez los derechos fundamentales transmiten una serie de parámetros para la protección del ser humano, pero tal vez la forma a través de la cual son propuestos fuera de Occidente demuestra la existencia de un proceso de modelización represiva desde un sistema cultural dominante hacia los sistemas dominados, en el cual estos últimos resultan violentados estructuralmente por cuanto la consecuencia del fenómeno de modelización a través del derecho conllevara a su alineación cultural.
There are different cultural groups in Peru, many of which have their own system of conflict resolution through local custom. However, when this local custom or customary law is confronted with European-inspired national law, a sort of legal-cultural fusion is born in which customary law loses part of its cultural roots due to certain conditions prescribed by a majority cultural group. This problem is reflected, for example, in the Peruvian district of Amantaní, composed of islands in the Titicaca Lake, since its inhabitants have their own customary law against which national law tries to assert itself. Thus, although the Peruvian constitution recognizes the customary law of the native peoples, it requires them, for example, to respect the fundamental rights of the person, which are the result of an import from the West. But what one people considers fundamental must be fundamental for all? More importantly, does a majority or powerful cultural group have the legitimacy to impose a legal model on other cultural groups? In fact, perhaps fundamental rights convey a series of parameters for the protection of the human being, but perhaps the way in which they are proposed outside the West demonstrates the existence of a process of repressive modeling from a dominant cultural system to the dominated systems, in which the latter are structurally violated because the consequence of the modeling phenomenon through law will lead to their cultural alignment.
There are different cultural groups in Peru, many of which have their own system of conflict resolution through local custom. However, when this local custom or customary law is confronted with European-inspired national law, a sort of legal-cultural fusion is born in which customary law loses part of its cultural roots due to certain conditions prescribed by a majority cultural group. This problem is reflected, for example, in the Peruvian district of Amantaní, composed of islands in the Titicaca Lake, since its inhabitants have their own customary law against which national law tries to assert itself. Thus, although the Peruvian constitution recognizes the customary law of the native peoples, it requires them, for example, to respect the fundamental rights of the person, which are the result of an import from the West. But what one people considers fundamental must be fundamental for all? More importantly, does a majority or powerful cultural group have the legitimacy to impose a legal model on other cultural groups? In fact, perhaps fundamental rights convey a series of parameters for the protection of the human being, but perhaps the way in which they are proposed outside the West demonstrates the existence of a process of repressive modeling from a dominant cultural system to the dominated systems, in which the latter are structurally violated because the consequence of the modeling phenomenon through law will lead to their cultural alignment.
Descripción
Maestría en Derechos Humanos y Educación para la Paz
Palabras clave
ENSEÑANZA SUPERIOR, DERECHO CONSUETUDINARIO, LAGISLACIÓN, COSTUMBRES Y TRADICIONES, JUSTICIA, DERECHOS CIVILES Y POLÍTICOS, DERECHOS HUMANOS, PERÚ, HIGHER EDUCATION, CUSTOMARY LAW, LEGISLATION, CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS, JUSTICE, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS