¿Por qué son tan caros para el Estado los frijoles del gallo pinto?
Fecha
2021-08-17
Autores
Vega Vargas, Leiner
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Editor
La República
Resumen
La semana pasada escribí una columna sobre las inconsistencias del gobierno respecto de la regulación y gestión de política publica relacionadas con el gallo pinto, precios forzados a la baja en el arroz y frijoles por las nubes a través de las compras públicas. Muchos comentarios y preguntas sobre mis afirmaciones alrededor del Programa de Abastecimiento Institucional y el papel, que ha venido jugando para apoyar los productores nacionales, me hacen publicar esta segunda columna relacionada con el tema. Quiero concentrarme esencialmente en el mercado del frijol y los avatares que representa la gestión de compras institucionales en el Consejo Nacional de la Producción. Las preguntas que guían la columna son las siguientes: ¿Qué sucede en el limbo en el cuál el PAI no les compra a los frijoleros nacionales y debe adquirir producto importado? ¿Quiénes y en qué proporción participan de la tajada de compras de frijoles importadas para el PAI? ¿Es correcto que el CNP a través del PAI beneficie con grandes compras públicas a empresarios o comerciantes relacionados con Asociaciones de productores que no producen frijol?
Last week I wrote a column about the government’s inconsistencies regarding the regulation and management of public policy related to gallo pinto, forced down prices on rice and beans by the clouds through public purchases. Many comments and questions about my statements about the Institutional Sourcing Program and the role it has been playing to support domestic producers make me publish this second column related to the issue. I want to concentrate mainly on the market for beans and the avatars represented by the management of institutional purchases in the National Production Council. The questions that guide the column are the following: What happens in limbo in which the PAI does not buy from domestic beans and must purchase imported products? Who and in what proportion participate in the share of purchases of imported beans for the PAI? Is it correct that the CNP through the PAI benefits with large public purchases from businessmen or merchants related to associations of producers that do not produce beans?
Last week I wrote a column about the government’s inconsistencies regarding the regulation and management of public policy related to gallo pinto, forced down prices on rice and beans by the clouds through public purchases. Many comments and questions about my statements about the Institutional Sourcing Program and the role it has been playing to support domestic producers make me publish this second column related to the issue. I want to concentrate mainly on the market for beans and the avatars represented by the management of institutional purchases in the National Production Council. The questions that guide the column are the following: What happens in limbo in which the PAI does not buy from domestic beans and must purchase imported products? Who and in what proportion participate in the share of purchases of imported beans for the PAI? Is it correct that the CNP through the PAI benefits with large public purchases from businessmen or merchants related to associations of producers that do not produce beans?
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Palabras clave
FRIJOLES, PEQUEÑOS AGRICULTORES, PRODUCCIÓN AGRÍCOLA, CNP, COSTA RICA, BEANS, SMALL FARMERS, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION