Una defensa del anti-especismo
Fecha
2021-12
Autores
Rivera Mora, Daniel
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
Universidad Nacional, Costa Rica
Resumen
En el presente artículo se hace una descripción y critica del antropocentrismo especista. Teniendo como base este tipo de especismo las tesis kantianas y cartesianas respecto a las capacidades cognitivas de los animales no humanos. Por tanto, se intenta a partir de estudios relativos al cognitivismo animal mostrar que la base de este tipo de especismo es insostenible y por ende los humanos deben tener un mínimo de consideración moral hacia los animales no humanos.
This article relates to a critical description of anthropocentric speciesism considering Cartesian and Kant’s theoretical framework as a reference and foundation regarding the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. By considering previous research related to animal cognitivism, this study intends to show that speciesism is not defensible. Consequently, human beings should reconsider their moral perspective toward nonhuman animals.
This article relates to a critical description of anthropocentric speciesism considering Cartesian and Kant’s theoretical framework as a reference and foundation regarding the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. By considering previous research related to animal cognitivism, this study intends to show that speciesism is not defensible. Consequently, human beings should reconsider their moral perspective toward nonhuman animals.
Descripción
Palabras clave
RAZÓN, FILOSOFÍA, ANIMALES, ÉTICA, DISCRIMINACIÓN, REASON, PHILOSOPHY, ANIMALS, ETHICS, DISCRIMINATION